T H E A R M Y A I R ARM B E T W E E N TWO WARS
cal progress of commercial aviation and of foreign powers in the
development of planes which in themselves forced new considerations
upon those men who were charged with our national At
the same time there can be no question regarding the positive contri-
bution of the Air Corps itself to the development of planes of greater
size and longer range.
It is significant that the story of the Army’s long-range bomber has
its beginning in proposals of 1 9 3 3 for the construction of an ultra
long-range bomber that immediately would have relegated such a
plane as the B-I 7 to the category of medium range. Equally significant
is the fact that the proposed plane was intended for a mission of
coastal defense and that the proposal was advanced under circum-
stances decidedly favorable to its acceptance. T o understand those
circumstances, it is necessary to turn back two years to the MacArthur-
Pratt agreement of 1 9 3 I , which, for the time being a t least, promised a
permanent settlement of controversial issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither space nor time will permit here an attempt to survey the
extended controversy which preceded that agreement. %riefly, the
introduction of the airplane as a weapon of war had brought confusion
and sharp debate into areas of defensive responsibility theretofore
clearly enough defined. Defense of the coast traditionally had been
an Army function; it fortified and manned positions of obvious impor-
tance to the defense of coastal cities and other areas of special strategic
significance, and it was expected to take such additional steps as were
required to repel an attempted invasion across the coast line. The
Navy, on the other hand, placed a high premium on the mobility of its
fleet, and, while necessarily dependent upon shore installations, it
avoided commitments for coastal defense that would tend to tie down
the fleet. Even the defense of naval shore installations was a primary
responsibility of the Army. Because of the limited range of coastal
defense weapons and an obligation for the safety of shipping, how-
ever, the Navy necessarily assumed certain responsibilities for the
protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in
contradistinction to the Army’s, were limited, and it was readily
admitted that final responsibility within the range of land-based
weapons lay with the Army. The airplane, of course, effectively
extended the range of the Army’s land-based weapons, and, in so doing,
it gave to that service the means to extend its operations in defense of
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