T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
tion to strict budgetary limits, the mission assigned to the air force
denies the necessity for a full exploration of the independent function
of the air weapon, the experimental program faces a double hazard.
T h e Air Corps Act of 1926 had the effect of shifting the emphasis
from experimental development to the procurement of standardized
equipment. In addition to fixing the authorized strength of the Air
Corps at just over to,ooo men of all ranks, the section of the act calling
for a five-year program of expansion set as the goal a force of 1,800
planes. Such an objective did not necessarily preclude the possibility
of a continued and vigorous experimental program. But over the en-
suing five years appropriations requested by the Air Corps were cut
through action of the War Department and the Bureau of the Budget
on an average of close to 40 per cent.16’ And while annual appropria-
tions now averaged over twenty-five million, or approximately double
the appropriation for 1924, the Air Corps’ allotment of funds to re-
search and development remained at the figure of just over two million
to which it had fallen since that year. N o t until the fiscal year 1933
would the sum allotted to these purposes again exceed three million
dollars.‘
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that some of the criticism of
experimental work in the Air Service after the war had sprung from a
lack of sympathy with the broad objectives of the Army’s airmen. As
late as 1936 the Air Corps would be charged in an official report with
having been led astray by the allurement of a quest for the ultimate in
aircraft performance at the expense of practical military need.le3
But technical and financial limitations, together with an incomplete
development of Air Corps doctrine, apparently prevented the raising
of any serious doctrinal issue in connection with the materiel program
until the late 1920’s.As already noted, even Billy Mitchell had emerged
from his experiences in World W a r I with the conviction that pursuit
represented the most important branch of military aviation, a view
that found reflection in the experimental program of the Air Service.
T h e observation plane also received much of the Engineering Divi-
sion’s attention in the search for a substitute for the DH-4 of World
War I, and the official designation of “attack” plane had its origin in
1922 to describe observation types specially equipped for ground
strafing. As for the bombers developed, technical barriers kept their
performance well within limits that would be considered appropriate
for a mission in support of ground armies.’”
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