T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
expeditionary force, and GHQ aviation, in addition to its role of close
support, would assist materially in off shore reconnaissance and inter-
ception of an enemy expedition. But such functions required a closer
definition of the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy, a
problem that was referred to the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.
In a report, “Doctrines for the Employment of the GHQ Air Force,”
2 6 September 1934, the Joint Board accepted in substance the recom-
mendations of the Drum and Baker reports, but the tendency of both
chese reports to discount the role of air power was reflected in a much
less clearly defined statement of Air Corps responsibilities in national
defense than had been hoped for in 1931.12* A year later the Air Corps
mission was described more formally in a revision of Joint Action of
the Army and Navy, promulgated on I I September 1935. This pro-
vided that the Army air component was “ t o operate as an arm of the
mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in
support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain conditions Army
aviation was also to conduct “air operations in support of or in lieu of
naval forces.” lZ5These passages were ambiguous enough to be accept-
able to both Army and Navy and too ambiguous to be of service to
either.
In October 1934,Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, had for-
warded to appropriate commands the Joint Board’s paper on employ-
ment of the GHQ Air Force.lZOIn anticipation of the imminent
reorganization of the Air Corps he directed that air doctrines be re-
stated “with a view to a broader understanding of the Air Corps’ place
in the scheme of national defense and in expectation of doing away
with misconceptions and interbranch prejudices.” lZ7
On 2 I December, Brig. Gen. C.E. Kilbourne of the General Staff’s
War Plans Division forwarded to the Chief of the Air Corps, as
a “sighting shot,” a draft proposal for “Doctrines of Army Air
Corps.’’ This paper drew heavily upon the Drum and Baker reports,
though it gave to the counterair activities of the GHQ Air Force a
greater prominence than had either. Kilbourne’s draft was criticized
severely by members of the Air Corps Tactical School and of the
Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, including Maj. Carl Spaatz, be-
cause it subordinated strategic bombardment to attacks on enemy air
power.12QA somewhat more acceptable statement appeared in a re-
vised edition of T R 440- I 5, Employment of the Air Forces of the
48