T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
demonstrate the necessity of a preparedness program for our air
force.” * The present history has no such dogmatic aim. Its authors
believe with one of the wisest military leaders of our generation that
“in our democracy where the government is truly an agent of the
popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion” and
that the historian can render “the most essential service in determining
the public policy relating to National Defense.” But they have taken
to heart also his warning that historians “have been inclined to record
victories and gloss over the mistakes and wasteful sacrifices” and that
it is very important that the true facts, the causes and consequences
that make our military history, should be matters of common knowl-
edge.” t The present authors make no claims to have succeeded in
following this counsel of perfection, but they have tried to set down as
they have understood it the story of the Army air arm for the people
to whom that arm belongs.
This book, then, may be considered as a final report to the American
public on the activities of the AAF in World War 11. It is not an
official report in the ordinary sense of that term-one to which the
Air Staff necessarily subscribes in all its details and final conclusions.
Rather it is the report of a group of professionally trained historians
who during the war enjoyed an unusual opportunity for access to the
files of the AAF while those files were still active, and who since the
termination of hostilities have received the co-operation of Head-
quarters, United States Air Force, in plans to provide for the American
public a comprehensive account of their findings. It is pertinent, there-
fore, to include here a brief account of the historical program of which
this history is an end product and to tell something about the back-
ground of the book and its authors.
After the United States entered World War 11, the Army Air
Forces was among the first organizations to display an active interest
in maintaining a historical record. The first hectic months after Pearl
Harbor left little time in a military headquarters for consideration of
anything beyond the ways and means of meeting each successive
emergency call. But in June 1942 the Chief of the Air Staff directed
that a professional historian be secured for the preparation of “a run-
< c *
* H. A. Toulmin, Air Service, AEF, 1918 (New York, 1 9 2 7 ) ~Foreword,. p. v.
+‘‘National Organization for War,” an address before the joint meeting of the
American Military Institute and the American Historical Association, Washington,
28 Dec. 1939, in Selected Speeches and Stntements of General of the Army George C.
Marshall, ed. Maj. H. A. DeWeerd (Washington, 1945), pp. 35-39.
viii