T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
local defense of strategic points-New Yorli, the Canal Zone, Alaska,
Hawaii, etc.-and other units should be attached to ground and sea
forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as other powers were developing
aviation for “striking their adversaries as far away from their own
countries as possible,” the United States should have as its first objec-
tive the “creation of an air force capable of the greatest radius of action
practicable under the conditions limited by personnel, material, and
armament.” 92 A n efficient air force organized according to these
principles “would be able to protect the country from invasion and
would insure its independence but would not be able to subject a
hostile country to invasion without leaving the country itself.” 93
Fortunately the string of northern islands led away from, as well as
toward, the United States. They could be seized, held by air units plus
a small ground force garrison, supplied if necessary by air transport,
and used as a means of striking directly at the industrial heart of a
European or Asiatic enemy.94W a r might become then first a struggle
for air bases, followed by a strategic bombardment campaign. In the
end ground forces must actually take over the enemy’s territory, but
through its long-range operations the “influence of air power on the
ability of one nation to impress its will on another in an armed conflict
will be decisive.” 9 5
Under the guise of Winged Defense Mitchell was pleading the cause
of an offensive weapon to be used in a fashion not yet sanctioned by
custom. Highly sensitive to public opinion, he was somewhat handi-
capped in drawing a realistic picture by his concern with his audience.
T h e wisdom of having entered World W a r I was widely questioned,
so Mitchell had to assume that we would go to war only if attacked
directly and that we would fight without allies who might provide
advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air force
power is the bombardment airplane” and that strategic bombardment
was “the one outstanding development that occurred in the European
War.” O 6 Yet he was most specific in describing the effects of such
warfare if applied against the United States; civilians are shown
stampeding in N e w York under aerial attack but not in Berlin or
Tokyo. It was the same sort of disingenuousness which made him
speak of bombing the sources of an enemy’s productive power but
“not so much the people themselves” 97-as if some subtle distinction
would be made between factory and worker.
In his last book, a sort of primer for the layman called Skyways
4’