T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
and served in England for the indoctrination of newly arrived units."
During the months following submission of his report to General
Chaney, General Eaker and his staff also formulated detailed plans
for the establishment of a training organization in the British Isles.
They planned that all training at first would be conducted under
direction of Bomber Command, and made arrangements for the ac-
quisition from the RAF of a nearly completed installation a t Boving-
don in Hertfordshire, northwest of London, and of its satellite field
at Oakley. Eaker requested still another site (the choice eventually
fell on Cheddington, near Bovingdon) for use in the training of fighter
units. Necessary personnel and equipment were requested from the
United States, and training schedules adjusted to the requirements
of the initial groups expected in May were presented to USAFBI."
These schedules were revised upward in May upon receipt of informa-
tion that the build-up planned for the Eighth called for thirty combat
groups, both bomber and fighter, to reach the United Kingdom by
October 1942.'~Accordingly, the Americans now requested a total
of eight airdromes for use in training, three to be used for fighter
pilots and five for bomber crews. Because of the R A F s reluctance
to use for training purposes badly needed operational airdromes in
England, the British recommended that the Eighth consider the use
of Ulster (Northern Ireland), where seven airdromes could be made
available for the purpose.73 Such was the arrangement agreed upon
as through May and June plans for a training establishment took shape.
Since it was intended that organized tactical units on arrival would
go directly to their permanent stations for familiarization and final
pre-combat training, the interest in special training installations arose
from concern for the problem of replacement.'* General Eaker had
calculated, on the basis of British experience which admittedly was
not entirely valid for daylight operations, that American bomber
losses would average 5 per cent per mission on the basis of ten mis-
sions a month, and 3 per cent for twelve missions per month in the
case of fighter^.?^ T o assure operation of each unit a t maximum
strength, the projected training establishment would serve principally
to provide combat crew replacement centers (CCRC) from which
fully trained crews could be supplied as combat losses occurred. At
the Arnold-Portal conference in London late in May, it was agreed
that the RAF would provide eight fields for CCRC's by September
1942 and a total of sixteen by the following April.76 In June 1942,
62 7