T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
organizations in the British Isles.41 It remained the ranking AAF
command until the opening of General Spaatz’ headquarters on
18 June.
The preparatory effort which meantime fell under Eaker’s direc-
tion may be conveniently divided into two broad categories-logistics
and operations. In either category much of the work consisted of
planning, for the immediate future or on a long-range basis. It was
natural that actual accomplishments were largely within the realm of
logistics, for before the bomber campaign could begin much had
to be done in such important if unspectacular fields as supply, mainte-
nance, transportation, technical training, and housekeeping. Opera-
tions in the narrowest sense could begin only with the first attack
on the enemy, but even when conceived in the usual fashion to
include operational training and the development of auxiliary opera-
tional techniques, the Eighth was long handicapped by lack of combat
planes and of tactical experience.
It was possible to draw upon the rich operational experience of the
RAF, however, and during the spring and early summer of 1942,
basic decisions in the field of operational planning prepared the way
for a degree of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two great nations. The story
provides another significant chapter in the long history of Anglo-
American relations. If a t times leaders of the RAF tended to view
paternally the untried theories of the AAF and displayed an under-
standable disposition to guide the Americans along paths tested in
the bitter experience of actual combat, they at the same time under-
stood and respected the organizational capacity and the experimental
temperament of the people with whom they were now allied. And if
the Americans were inclined to insist upon the establishment of a
completely independent air force, one that would be copartner and
not junior partner in the assault on Germany, they also represented
an organization that for over two years had sought helpful lessons in
the experience of the RAF and had found there proof of its own
basic assumptions. Differences on certain matters would persist
throughout the war, as was only natural, but to the many ties which
joined the two peoples there was added in this instance the bond
that makes all airmen one.
The Eaker plan of 20 March assumed that in the highly important
field of target selection the work would be done in conference be-
6 2 I