T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
mations but immediately began an investigation of means to increase
the firepower of U.S. bombers. After making a detailed comparison
of the British Stirling and Manchester with the Fortress One, AWPD
recommended that the B-17 and B-24 be equipped with ten machine
guns, mounted in turrets where possible. This followed RAF practice
as to number, but the guns were to be heavier, of .50 caliber rather
than . 3 0 3 . Better equipment for oxygen and heating should be de-
veloped, and a board of officers should be named to draw up charac-
teristics for a long-range escort plane.z11
The recommendation for increased armament was followed imme-
diately, and the B-I~E-the first model to be used in combat by the
Eighth Air Force-was the most heavily armed bomber in the theater.
The design for the escort plane was slower in its evolution. The fail-
ure to have developed such a plane was the most serious flaw in the
AAF’s program, and it is difficult to account for. Again, the fact that
national defense rather than strategic bombardment against European
powers had been the prevailing influence in the twenties and early
thirties must have been important.212The effect of Douhet’s writings
a t the Air Corps Tactical School has been referred to above,” and
Douhet taught that heavily armed bombers in mass formations could
operate by day against fighter Whatever the reason, the
AAF was approaching a major war without a long-range escort for its
bomberst The type of plane recommended in AWPD/I to remedy
this lack was more akin to a modified bomber than to any existing
pursuit Eaker, on a mission to England in September 1941,
secured information which seemed to corroborate this
and eventually such an expedient was followed. Almost a year later,
in August 1942, a board headed by Brig. Gen. A.J. Lyon submitted
a plan for modifying the B-17 and B-24 into “destroyer escort
planes.” 216 That suggestion was followed, and the resulting YB-40
and YB-41 were to have a brief and unhappy trial in the ETO. But
when war came it was apparent that our early bombardment opera-
tions would be run without benefit of escorts over the target, a fact
which accentuated the need of improved techniques.
Research toward that end had paralleled those dealing with equip-
ment. A board had been established in July 1941 to evaluate bombing
accuracy in the AAF, and in response to Chaney’s recommendations,
* See above, p. 51.
+For one possible explanation, see above, pp. 64-65.
604