P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
brought vigorous rejoinders from the War Department and Air Min-
istry,lss and the attacks were not at the time successful. A more
dangerous threat to the program of strategic bombing as conceived in
AWPD/I, if not to production priorities, came from the efforts of
the JCS to swing strategy over to a second front. This meant shorten-
ing rather than eliminating the bomber offensive, but inevitably it
placed a new emphasis upon close support. T h e AAF supported the
new trend, but with evident disappointment on the part of some of
its members. O n the whole, American airmen had been somewhat
less outspoken than British in claims that air power alone might crush
Germany, but this reflected, perhaps, their inferior position in the
military organization rather than any serious misgivings. Eaker's re-
action to BOLERO, as expressed in a letter of 26 April 1942, may be
taken as typical:
After two months spent in understudying British Bomber Command it is
still believed that the original all-out air plan for the destruction of the German
war effort by air action alone was feasible and sound, and more economical
than any other method available. General Arnold points out, however, that
the required means is not now available, and time does not allow for the
completion of this total air effort, hence it now seems wise to combine a
limited air effort with ground forces to open up a Western European
When Spaatz arrived two months later, he could maintain in friendly
debate with Harris the official American view that the invasion was
necessary to victory, but it was essentially a question of whether
strategic bombing would be the sole weapon or only the most impor-
tant.''O In neither case was there any doubt as to the crippling effects
of an all-out attack on German industry. But as to the mode of attack
there was still no unanimity of opinion.
When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF was already engaged in a bomber offen-
sive over Europe with a carefully chosen system of objectives and a
technique adapted to the means available. Then and later Bomber
Command was forced, somewhat grudgingly and at times only
through pressure from the government, to divert a considerable share
of its effort to attacks on tactical objectives, often maritime in na-
ture."' But in mid- I 94 I , preferred target systems consisted of trans-
portation centers and the industrial communities surrounding them.
This choice marked a change from earlier attacks on the oil industry,
and the rationale of that shift was explained by the British at the
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