T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the bomber offensive was viewed by most members of the Anglo-
American chiefs of staff committees as a means by which the German
war machine could be trimmed down to size. Strategic bombardment,
then, was a form of attrition to be used simultaneously with others-
the blockade, economic pressure through neutrals, subversive activi-
ties, psychological warfare, and commando raids.15’ Developed in
1940 by the British, this concept of war was grounded in realistic
appraisal of current capabilities. British manpower was pitifully weak
in comparison with that of Axis and satellite nations, and imperial
policies dictated a wide dispersal of forces as well as an impregnable
defense of the home islands. Materiel losses sustained in the Battle of
France had hardly been recouped by 1941,and a return to the con-
tinent in that year was unthinkable. The strategy was sanctioned, too,
by ancient tradition. For centuries England in her European wars had
relied on the Royal Navy, a small professional army, and the land
forces of allies. In 1914-18 that tradition had been broken; large
citizen armies had fought in France and Belgium, and the losses had
been appalling. That experience had strongly affected British military
thought between the wars,152and lessons drawn therefrom seemed
painfully substantiated by the fortunes of the British Expeditionary
Force in 1940. The new strategy, then, was but a return to the old,
with Bomber Command thrown in as the only offensive weapon.
Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of
Commons that “there seems to be every reason to believe that this
new kind of war is well suited to the genius and the resources of the
British nation and the British Empire and that, once we get properly
equipped and properly started, a war of this kind will be more favor-
able to us than the sombre mass slaughters of the Somme and Pas-
schendaele.”’53 It was in accordance with this view that heavy
bombers had been given, next to the requirements for home security,
highest priority in the British production program;154 and that
Bomber Command had stepped up the tempo of the operations begun
on a modest scale in the summer of 1940. So when Hitler’s attack on
the U.S.S.R. reduced the imbalance of forces, the new situation was
viewed as an aid to current strategy rather than as an invitation to
open a second front. This attitude is epitomized in a remark attributed
to Air Minister Sir Archibald Sinclair, to the effect that “our two
mightiest weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this strategy had evolved before there was any
5 9 2