P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
including bombardment and pursuit aviation, in offensive operations.
Specifically, he was asked to review in light of the new strategy the
command structure outlined in his letter of 2 0 September and in his
radio messages of 3 0 January and 2 7 February, and to suggest any
modifications that seemed desirable.lZ6If this was not an order to
adopt Arnold’s suggestion, the implications were plain enough. A
week later, on the eve of his flight to the London BOLERO confer-
ence, Marshall cabled that Spaatz would organize and train an air
force in the States, and later direct its operations under USAFBI.”’
This was definite. Whatever detailed shape Chaney’s plan might take,
its general outlines had been determined. While Marshall was in Lon-
don, Arnold sent him, on 1 2 April, the air plan for BOLER0.12*
Already approved by WPD, this called for [he establishment in Eng-
land of the Eighth Air Force with its thre constituent commands.
air force organization to be established in Great Britain; but tacitly
on I May and unequivocally on the following day he indicated that
he had accepted Arnold’s plan in all important respects.1so Within a
few days he had given practical demonstration of his concurrence by
making arrangements for the actual siting of the headquarters of the
Eighth Air Force and the VITI Bomber, Fighter, and Service
Commands.’s1
Thus when Spaatz assumed command of the Eighth Air Force at
Bolling Field on 5 May,132the air organization for USAFBI had been
determined along general rather than specific lines. H e was anxious to
clarify his responsibilities under the BOLERO plan, but was to find
that no easy task. The commitment to BOLERO had perhaps tipped
the scales in favor of Arnold’s plan, but in some respects it had com-
plicated the organizational problem. For one thing, the “balanced” air
force contemplated for the invasion seemed to require a more elab-
orate internal structure: already the VIII Ground Air Support Com-
mand had been activated, on 2 8 April,1ss and other commands were
to be added soon.* The invasion would call for much closer co-opera-
tion with surface forces than had the original concept of a bomber
offensive, and in delineating the exact relations which the Eighth
would have toward other U.S. forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the theater and that to be
set up later for the invasion force, Ultimate decisions lay with the
Chaney held up his own arrangements “pen!iing clarification” of the
* See below, p. 616.
587