P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
meager to serve as a reliable guide, but in general the British
were pessimistic concerning the Soviet Union’s chances of survival.
SLEDGEHAMMER had been always thought of as an emergency
operation, yet now the British chiefs of staff were dubious of its wis-
dom under any conditions: an operation of its contemplated mag-
nitude would offer little relief to the U.S.S.R., and if that country
collapsed the expedition might prove a serious tactical loss. The
British had been examining alternative projects-a lodgment at Brest
or Cherbourg, large-scale raids (Dieppe was then in the offing), or a
campaign in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s
anxiety to get U.S. troops into action in 1942 had led him to examine
other possibilities, including an offensive from Australia and the re-
vival of GYMNAST.45 The latter plan might offer effective relief
to Auchinleck in the Middle East-a second front to benefit the Brit-
ish rather than the Soviets; yet after mature deliberation, the Com-
bined Chiefs stood squarely and “without reservations” behind
decisions made at London in mid-April. Those decisions were indorsed
in an informal meeting on 19 June,46and more definitively in a paper
approved on the z IS^,^? Therein it was declared as considered opinions
of the CCS that: ( I ) the United States and Great Britain should ad-
here to their resolve ro push BOLERO; ( 2 ) no other offensive opera-
tion should be undertaken in 1942 save in a grave emergency; ( 3 )
specifically, GYMNAST should not be adopted under existing
conditions; and (4) planning for an emergency attack on western
Europe in 1942 should be continued. This should have left
ROUNDUP with highest priority, SLEDGEHAMMER a possi-
bility, and ruled out their most formidable rival, the North African
operation. What happened at the government level is not entirely
clear. Brig. Gen. Asa N. Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air
Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill had made a
successful plea to the President “for a lot of assistance in the Middle
East,” despite objections from the American chiefs of staff .48 The
formal record of the Combined Chiefs indicates no sudden change in
strategy. On Z I June, a t a White House meeting, the President and
Prime Minister accepted the sense of the CCS recommendations,
though with an escape clause. Plans for ROUNDUP in 1943 were to
be pushed, but the two nations must be prepared to act in 1942.
Operations in France or the Low Countries would yield greatest re-
sults and should be considered, but if they appeared impractical, the
57’