T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
“the only entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the
Army, which “with its own air forces remains the ultimate decisive
factor in war.” T h e board was firmly opposed to either the unified de-
fense department or the independent air force. T h e history of the air
arm showed, it believed, that “the Air Corps has virtually been inde-
pendent since its inception”; that production failures of 19 I 7- I 8 had
occurred because of its practical exemption from General Staff con-
trol; and that independent air force operations had not been decisive in
the war. Hence the report concluded that “the time has arrived for the
Air Corps to become in all respects a homogeneous part of the Army,
under General Staff control, and be subject to military coordination,
study, influence and operation.” 5 6 Less, not more, autonomy was the
cure for Air Corps ills. T h e desired results could be obtained by
eliminating the now vacant post of Assistant Secretary of War; mak-
ing the Chief of the Air Corps responsible for individual training, pro-
curement, and supply under the Secretary; and following the Drum
Board’s recommendation for establishing a GHQ air force under the
Chief of Staff.
One civilian, James H. Doolittle, filed a minority report, advocating
separation of the Air Corps from the Army.57
T h e Howell commission was free from W a r Department domina-
tion, and many felt that its verdict might run counter to that of the
Baker Board. However, after the latter’s report it appeared wiser to
give the GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures,
and Howell’s group made no recommendations on the organization
of military a~iation.~’T h e reorganization suggested by Baker went
into effect on I March 1935.59 Tactical units scattered through the
nine corps areas were assigned to the GHQ Air Force, with head-
quarters at Langley Field; its three wings were located at Langley
(Va.) , Barksdale (La.), and March (Calif.) fields. As Commanding
General, GHQ Air Force, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews was respon-
sible for organization, training, and operation of the force, reporting
to the Chief of Staff in peace, the commander of the field forces in
war. The Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, retained
responsibility for individual training, procurement, and supply. Ad-
ministrative control of the air bases remained in the hands of the sev-
eral corps area commanders.
Thus, although the GHQ Air Force provided an improved com-
mand structure for operations by concentrating a considerable share
3 ’