P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
sive and allow time for the AAF to build a force appropriate to the
invasion itself. In neither case did the plan follow exactly the earlier
pattern of thought in the AAF-as exhibited, say, in AWPD/r.* T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as a most vital part of the over-all strategy: an operation
which by the destruction of well-chosen targets might suffice to
bring Germany to her knees or, more probably, would weaken her
war potential to the degree that the success of an invasion would be
assured. In the new plans-in SLEDGEHAMMER especially but to
a lesser degree in ROUNDUP-the emphasis was on counterair
measures; even strategic bombing was looked on as a means of pro-
voking German resistance so that the Luftwaffe might be trimmed
down and the Allies might secure that superiority in the air deemed
necessary for a successful crossing of the Channel. The importance
of this aspect of the air offensive had been appreciated in both allied
air forces. RAF officers and General Eaker alike were of the opinion
that an intensive bomber offensive would in itself constitute some-
thing of a second front by drawing GAF strength westward; ’’ and
Eaker feared, not without justification, that an attempt to build up
air and ground forces simultaneously would react unfavorably against
priorities which logic and previous designs had given to the AAF.
But those opinions were submerged in the new strategy; air plans
must be built around the alternative schemes for invasion. This meant,
for one thing, a reappraisal of target objectives. General Spaatz ex-
plained this necessity to Mr. Stimson by pointing out that whereas
the European strategy had originally been conceived as involving the
use of air power supported by ground forces, it was now a matter of
air power supporting ground forces.28 The new strategy demanded
also a re-examination of the needs of the Army air force in Britain
in terms of trained units and equipment.
That review was necessary first because the new mission could not
be carried out with the B-17’s and B-24’s and fighters which had been
intended as the bomber command’s striking force. The need now, as
Arnold said, was for a “balanced force.” 2 9 But there were also wider
issues touching the assignment of organized units to the various
theaters and the allocation of aircraft production potential among the
several nations. It has previously been shown that at ARCADIA the
output of American aircraft factories for 1942 had been allotted to
See above, pp. 148-49.
565