T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
aircrews was the search, the effort to locate an almost invisible object
in the vast stretches of the ocean. It often seemed like trying to find
the proverbial needle in a stack of hay, and as a matter of fact it
was possible for crews to spend hundreds of flying hours with barely
a sighting to show for the effort. It was, therefore, natural that radar
should become the greatest of all antisubmarine weapons. The Ger-
man submarines would not feel the full effect of this aid until 1943,
but its potentialities were initially explored during I 942.
As shipping losses mounted in the spring of that year, it had be-
come clear that to defeat the U-boat an expanded antisubmarine
force would not in itself be sufficient. Accordingly, on 3 0 May 1942,
General Arnold ordered his director of Technical Services to establish
the Sea-Search Attack Development Unit (SADU) with headquar-
ters at Langley Field. This organization was to concern itself primarily
with the development of tactics and techniques of antisubmarine war-
fare, making use of all special devices available or under develop-
ment. It was also to serve as an experimental group, testing and
demonstrating devices which might be submitted to it for considera-
tion, and as an agency for training crews in antisubmarine tactics. In
the course of this work of research, testing, and training, or in addi-
tion to it if need be, the unit was to participate directly in the de-
struction of submarines. SADU was further directed to establish
and maintain the closest possible liaison with “all other centers of
research and development relating to the elements, systems and tac-
tics” of antisubmarine ~ a r f a r e . ~ ’In order to free it from the en-
cumbrance of complicated command channels, the Commanding
General, AAF, assumed command of the new unit through his
director of Technical Services. Operationally, however, it came under
the control of I Bomber Command. It was activated on 8 June 1942.
In addition to Headquarters, 1st Sea-Search Attack Group, it was
assigned a tactical unit, the 2d Sea-Search Attack Squadron, which
eventually operated some ten ASV-equipped €3- I 8’s. In December
1942, the 3d Sea-Search Attack Squadron was activated in order to
test and modify the newly acquired B-24’s. On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two radar-equipped Liberators.80
The 1st Sea-Search Attack Group acquitted itself well in anti-
submarine operations. Owing to its superior equipment, it in fact
contributed somewhat more than its share of sightings and attacks,
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