T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
activities, they would have to be provided for the purpose of counter-
ing the U-boat threat in whatever quantity considered feasible in
the light of other commitments.
Such being the case, the Air Staff preferred to retain possession
of the antisubmarine bomber forces to be made available and to
employ them in accordance with the Army responsibility set forth
in Joint Action for operations “in support of or in lieu of naval
forces.” In that way, it was felt, a serious duplication of equipment,
maintenance, and supply would be avoided, which otherwise would
eventually “deny the essential difference between armies and
navies.” 5 6 The question of duplication was all the more serious because
it was evident that the bombers requested were not to be employed
exclusively for antisubmarine operations in the Atlanti~.~’In other
words, the implications of the proposed transfer were far reaching in
their effect on the fundamental question of control of land-based
aviation engaged in seaward operation^.^^
General Arnold proposed, therefore, as a solution of the problem
of providing additional forces for antisubmarine warfare a compro-
mise which would retain the principle of ultimate responsibility as
set forth in Joint Action and which enjoyed the support of precedent.
In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab-
lishment of a Coastal Command, within the Army Air Corps, which
will have for its purpose operations similar to the Coastal Command,
Royal Air Force,” operating “when necessary” under the control of
proper naval authorities. The advantages of such an organization, he
felt, would be compelling. It would be uniquely trained and equipped
for the job. It would also possess the flexibility necessary for anti-
submarine action, and could readily be reduced in strength as the
need decreased, the units then simply reverting to normal bombard-
ment duty without becoming stranded wastefully in a naval program
which presumably would then have no place for them.59 This pro-
posal of General Arnold’s sounded the keynote for AAF policy in
the negotiations which culminated in the creation of the AAF Anti-
submarine Command.
It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That the Coastal Command
should provide something of a blueprint for a similar organization
in the United States was very natural, for it had pioneered in anti-
submarine warfare under circumstances roughly analogous to those
540