T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
back, two were damaged.83 Attacks on Myitkyina were resumed on
the 29th, when four planes bombed from 2 3 , 0 0 0 feet. The following
day a similar attack was made, but as no enemy activity was in evi-
dence on either occasion the attacks were di~continued.~~During the
first week of June, the small force undertook its final flights over
Burma before the weather and a shortage of spare parts combined to
ground the last of them.85 Five planes attacked the Rangoon docks
and harbor area on I June, reporting that one tanker had been sunk
and that another had been left listing.86Three days later, two bombers
struck a t the same target area without observing the results; attacked
by ten fighters, one plane was destroyed, another seriously damaged.87
And this was the last until the monsoon Iifted.
Brereton’s Departure for the Middle East
By mid-June, when the monsoon had come, the Americans were
beginning to appreciate the magnitude of the task involved in estab-
lishing and operating an air force in Asia. The report of the Grady
mission, plus three months of experience gained by the Tenth, had
revealed that even for a small force the 1ogisticaI probIem was stagger-
ing. Unable to use the more direct routes through the Mediterranean
and across the Pacific, and forced to sail in convoys for protection
against enemy submarines, ships from the United States required two
months to make the I 3,000-statute-mile voyage. Furthermore, the
demands of more active theaters for cargo ships, transports, and escort
vessels were so heavy that bottoms allotted to Asia were kept to the
barest minimum.88 And after the ships reached India the logistical
problems were by no means at an end. Japanese naval and air action
in the Bay of Bengal restricted the use of Calcutta and forced incom-
ing ships to dock along the west coast, where only three ports of any
importance were available-Cochin, Bombay, and Karachi. Cochin
was entirely too far south to serve as an American port of entry;
Bombay was overtaxed with British shipping. Hence, although heavy
port equipment had to be imported and existing storage space greatly
enlarged, the original choice of Karachi had been confirmed by sub-
sequent study.”
Had it been possible to use ports on the eastern shore, a third im-
portant problem might have been less troublesome; but dependence
on Karachi forced a maximum dependence on the Indian railroads.
Outside northwestern India, the railway system was not highly de-
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