T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
organization they would enjoy a very real freedom of choice. Ac-
cordingly, at the request of the Generalissimo, formal action had been
postponed until regular AAF units could be sent to assure continuity
of operations.18 Meanwhile, a shipment of P-4oE’s had been sent to
Takoradi on the west coast of Africa, where they were assembled for
ferrying to China. A few of these planes reached the A V G before
the fighting in Burma had ended; others followed in May and June.I9
And in the latter month, pilots of the 23d Fighter Group,* which had
been selected to replace the A V G , began to arrive under a plan to
use them as replacements for the Volunteers until the new unit had
built up sufficient strength to take over. There would be no break in
the support rendered our Chinese allies by American pilots, however
inadequate that support might be.
The Tenth Air Force
Meanwhile, in India the newly organized Tenth Air Force strug-
gled with peculiar problems of command, mission, and impotence.
O n the collapse of the ABDA effort, it had seemed to Generals Brett
and Brereton that Burma afforded perhaps the best opportunity for
a continued resistance to the Japanese. Though Australia as well as
Burma now was threatened, the latter presented the more immediate
need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as
early as 19 January and Moulmein on 3 I January; and as the enemy
paused to bring up additional forces, Rangoon was the logical objec-
tive of a renewed thrust. An attack on Rangoon inevitably raised the
question of continued supplies for China; and China, in addition to
her own ability to engage the enemy, offered the promise of air bases
within reach of sea communications upon which Japan’s victorious
forces depended, and even within reach of Japan itself. As for the
possibility that AAF bombers might make an immediate contribution
to the defense of Burma, Brady (by then a brigadier general) had
reported that heavy bomber operations against Bangkok and Saigon
would be feasible from Akyab through use of Magwe and Toungoo
as advanced bases.”
T h e objectives thus tentatively set at the time of Brereton’s de-
parture from Java received support in Washington, where there
was a keen awareness of the importance of aid to China. At the
ARCADIA conference in January, it had been agreed that a high-
* Pursuit units were redesignated “fighter” an 15 May 1942.
492