T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
land-based planes had carried out extensive reconnaissance of the
Solomons area from New Ireland southeastward to the eastern bound-
ary of the Southwest Pacific Area: they flew armed patrols along the
New Guinea coast eastward to the Louisiade islands and thence west-
ward to Port Moresby, over the Coral Sea west of Tulagi, through-
out the Bismarck Archipelago, across the mouth of the Gulf of
Carpentaria, and in the Darwin area. Operations were hampered
somewhat by unfavorable weather, by the great distances which had
to be flown, by the absence of fighter protection for bombers, and by
the inability of the B-17'~to hit rapidly moving surface targets from
high altitudes when bombing singly or in small flights6? The entire
action had indicated a lack of co-ordination between the Navy and
the AAF which under different circumstances might have cost the
Navy more serious damage than it suffered a t the hands of the Japa-
nese, for in the Coral Sea, some of the AAF planes had dropped their
bombs upon friendly ships.
One week after the battle, General MacArthur reported that com-
plete co-ordination with naval forces had been attained.68 Yet, if
co-ordination did exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level there was little or none, and this
was a factor which had hampered the forces in Australia in their
attempts to operate with the Navy. Men of the 19th Group were
forced to admit that they had attacked U.S. naval units, but they
pointed to a reason. Few of them had received adequate training in
recognition of surface craft as they fought through the Philippines and
Java campaigns, but more important, none of the intelligence officers
had any information as to the location of the friendly task forces; nor
had any identification signals with surface craft been established
bef~rehand.~'This lack of information on naval plans worked a very
real hardship on the bombardment commanders. Prior to the May
battle, they were unaware either of the Navy's presence or of its
plans. They knew only that occasionally they would be requested on
short notice to co-operate in a naval operation, but because the strik-
ing force was widely scattered along the rail line between Townsville
and Cloncurry, it was necessary to fly the aircraft some 600 to 800
miles to Port Moresby, where they were refueled in preparation for
missions at dawn on the following day. However, it was necessary for
them to reach Moresby by dusk, for otherwise there was inadequate
time for the refueling necessary to comply with the Navy's request."
450