C H A P T E R 12
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DRAWING THE BATTLE LINE
IN THE PACIFIC
HE SIX months which followed the attack upon Pearl Har-
bor were months in which the opposing lines of battle were
Tdrawn across the Pacific, but the drafting of these lines pre-
sented to the planners of Allied strategy a series of painful shocks.
One after another the great bases and focal points of Allied resistance
throughout the Southwest Pacific had been overrun by the full flood
of Japanese expansion, as the grand design of the enemy’s strategy
became increasingly clear. His prize was the fabulously rich Nether-
lands East Indies; by 10 March he held Java, and there remained only
the task of tidying up the loose ends through all the islands and the
final reduction of American forces in the Philippines. For the Japanese
planners, the problem now became one of organization of the gains.
Here, within their grasp, were rich stores of foodstuffs, minerals, and
the most vital resource of modern war, oil to fuel the fleet and power
the planes.
T o shield this vast empire, the Japanese navy felt the need for a
series of peripheral redoubts, minor and major bases which would
serve as sally ports, listening posts, and as effective deterrents to any
attempts on the part of the Allies to crash through into the vital com-
munication lines leading back to the home islands.’ Some of the islands
needed for the purpose already lay in Japanese hands, such as the
Marshalls and the Carolines, both of which groups had been obtained
so easily during the first World War; other bases, like Singapore,
Soerabaja, Amboina, and Rabaul were freshly acquired as the prod-
ucts of the relentless southern sweep of the enemy’s air, sea, and land
forces. Among the new bases were Guam and Wake, neither of them
so richly endowed as the Dutch or British prizes, but the capture of
’
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