T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
leaguered garrisons,36and plans for a special mission were completed
a t a conference attended by General George, Col. John H. Davies,
and others in Melbourne on 7 April. Accordingly, in the early morn-
ing of 11 April, ten B-25’s equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks and
three B-17’s took off from Darwin for the 1,500-mile flight to Min-
danao. General Royce was in command; Colonel Davies led the €3-2 5’9
and Capt. Frank Bostrom the B- I 7’s. All planes having arrived safely
at Del Monte, the B-25’~were then dispersed to neighboring auxiliary
fields. During the next two days attacks were made against shipping
and docks at Cebu, air and harbor facilities at Davao, and Nichols
Field on Luzon. The six badly worn and battered pursuit planes avail-
able on Mindanao were used in attempts to pin down enemy fighters
at near-by Davao airfield, and for protection of the bombers in land-
ing and taking off. They were unequal to the task, although during
the period they flew more sorties than the bombers. Enemy bombings
of Del Monte destroyed one of the B- I 7’s and seriously damaged the
other two. Indeed, only two heavy bomber sorties were completed,
one against Nichols Field and the other against shipping targets in
Cebu harbor. The B-25’s operated from better-concealed strips, and
in over twenty sorties sank one and possibly two other transports and
shot down three enemy a i r ~ r a f t . ~ ?
The American flyers returned to Australia with the loss of only one
B-17 and no casualties. The scope of the mission had been indeed
record-breaking; Captain Bostrum, for example, recorded thirty-eight
hours in the air and in all had flown approximately 6,000 nautical
miles to drop a load of bombs on Nichols Field. But one load of bombs
could count for little in the final checkup, and some of the participants
questioned whether the results justified the extraordinary effort re-
quired. Others returned with a memory chiefly of gallant men who
had serviced their planes on Mindanao-men who already knew their
doom. For this was the last major attempt to fly across the far-flung
battle lines to their aid.38
The Allied Air Forces
Meanwhile, in Australia and in Washington consultations proceeded
on urgent questions of command and organization. The dissolution of
the ABDA Command had left no provision for an over-all command
of Allied resistance to the southward thrust of the Japanese. Their
conquest of the Netherlands East Indies had created distinctly sep-
4’8