T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
of an early and vigorous offensive against Germany; (2) to concen-
trate forces against Germany with acceptance of the possibility of
losing all the Southwest Pacific; ( 3 ) to reinforce the Southwest Pacific
and related areas to a point sufficient to maintain a defensive position
while building up in the United Kingdom the forces required for
assumption of the offensive at the earliest possible date.15
It was a difficult decision. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been
prompt to recognize Germany as the most potent of our enemies and
to shape their strategy accordingly. At the same time, the key impor-
tance of Australia to plans for containing the Japanese had been
recognized, and its loss, or even the loss of any considerable part of
it, obviously might call into question the whole of the defensive
strategy agreed upon for the Pacific. Australia herself was unequal to
the task of providing her own defense. The best equipped and trained
of her troops had not yet returned from the battlefields of the Middle
East, and her air force in Australia on the outbreak of hostilities in
the Pacific possessed hardly more strength than did the Dutch in the
Netherlands East Indies. In the air especially, the burden of defending
Australia would have to fall upon the Americans. At Darwin the
RAAF could muster two understrength squadrons of Hudsons, one
squadron of Wirraways, and two squadrons equipped with American
A-24's. Even less well defended was Port Moresby with two reduced
squadrons of Catalinas, one reduced squadron of Hudsons, and one
squadron of Wirraways." Small in population and lacking adequate
industrial facilities, Australia would be dependent largely on British
and American production for the immediate equipment of her units
with modern planes. Upon the Americans, too, would fall the main
responsibility for defense of the island chain running back from
Australia to provide and shield a line of communication with the
United States, The Japanese at Rabaul were in position to move down
the Solomons toward the New Hebrides and the Fijis with as much
ease as now they advanced down the coast of New Guinea toward
Port Moresby, and it was evident that air reinforcements would be
required in addition to those already taking position along the South
Pacific route." Once again the decision favored maintenance of a de-
fensive position in the Pacific in the hope that an early offensive might
be mounted against Germany.
Of assistance in reaching this decision, no doubt, was the belief
* For discussion of the problem, see Chap. 1 2 .
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