L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
transports, and two unidentified ships. T h e crews claimed twenty-
three enemy aircraft shot down, but a t the same time at least thirty-
eight of our own bombers were lost-six in combat, six by accident,
and twenty-six destroyed on the ground.111
Valuable lessons had been learned or re-emphasized. Perhaps the
chief of these was the necessity to provide, particularly for heavy
bombers, adequate air defense of bases. T h e importance of camou-
flage, of revetments, and of the use of such devices of deception and
cover as the dummy plane had received new emphasis. It was evident,
however, that none of these would be enough in the absence of pro-
vision for adequate aircraft warning, antiaircraft defenses, and strong
interceptor forces. It also had been found that the LB-30 was vulner-
able to pursuit attack and that its performance above 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet was
unsatisfactory; that the B- I 7 needed more range and armament, that
its oxygen system possessed faults, and that it required a self-sealing
bomb bay tank.'" Generally, however, the B-17 crews praised their
plane, particularly for its ruggedness in carrying them through and
getting them back, and few of them perhaps would have denied that
there was a certain aptness in a description broadcast from Tokyo
which identified the big bomber as a "four engine pursuit ship, used
for all purposes."
Though the A-24 had been inadequately tested, it gave promise of
effective use against shipping targets. Its principal weaknesses, a short
range and insufficient armament, would require the establishment of
good advance bases and provision of strong pursuit e s c ~ r t . " ~T h e
P-40 had given a good account of itself-it could outdive the Japanese
fighters, was faster in level flight, and was better armored. But the
enemy plane seemed to have more range, could outclimb the P-40,
and was more maneuverable. For the American pilot to risk a dogfight
was to flirt with suicide.'15 Indeed, by no means least among the
lessons learned was a new respect for the foe.
It could be argued perhaps that it would have been a wiser course
to avoid the piecemeal commitment of our aircraft in the Netherlands
East Indies, and to have held them in Australia until a respectable
striking force had been built up and made ready for operation from
reasonably well-established bases there. But such an argument would
ignore important considerations of morale which had a bearing,
among other things, on the Allied hope of rallying within Asia itself
resistance to Japanese aggression. T h e Australians, British, and Dutch
40'