A I R T R A N S P O R T A N D F E R R Y I N G
twin-engine transports. Cargo handled amounted to approximately
2 , 0 0 0 tons in May and 2 , 5 0 0 tons in June.’”
For several months after war began, there was no serious overlap-
ping of the transport activities of the Ferrying Command and the Air
Service Command. T h e former was engaged only in long-range over-
seas operations, while the latter, at least in the beginning, confined
its own transport activities to the domestic field. But when the Air
Service Command began extending its operations beyond the borders
of the United States, areas of duplication developed, and by March
1942 the need arose for a clear division of responsibility. O n 24 March,
Generai Arnold issued a directive assigning to the Air Service Com-
mand responsibility for transporting aviation technical supplies to
points within the Western Hemisphere, including Alaska, the Carib-
bean area, Greenland, and Iceland. As soon as possible it was to
inaugurate a transport service to Honolulu. T h e Ferrying Command
was given control of all air transport services beyond the Western
Hemisphere and, for the time being, it was to control all ferrying of
aircraft within the United States and to overseas destinations. It will
be noted that the Ferrying Command’s title to its basic function of
ferrying aircraft within and beyond the United States was rendered
somewhat uncertain by the phrase “for the time being.” Furthermore,
the proposed Air Service Command operation to Honolulu would
have been in contravention of the Ferrying Command’s responsibility
to operate all transport services extending outside the Western Hemi-
sphere.186
Obviously, the whole arrangement was only a temporary expedient,
but nothing further in the way of clarification was attempted until
Jiine. By that time it had become apparent that the division of author-
ity given on 2 4 March had resulted, to quote General Arnold, in
“substantial duplication of effort and a confusing dual responsibil-
ity.” 1 8 7 Mr. L.W. Pogue, chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
in a memorandum dated 1 5 June, gave a detailed and trenchant
description of the confusion and duplication then prevalent in the
field of military air transport. H e expressed the opinion that the ideal
solution would be the creation of a new command, independent of
both the Army and the Navy, which should control practically all
military air transport operations. As a less desirable but more feasible
step he recommended that, a t the least, all air transport services within
the Army be unified under one command.lss
3 61