T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
War Plans Division suggested the latter solution in August, then
turned to fruitless efforts to reach an agreement by modifying the
present By September, General McNair had become skepti-
cal of the possibility of securing the authority requisite for effective
functioning of his office.lo0 From the August deliberations on, the
AAF favored drastic reorganization. O n 6 October the Air Staff pro-
rogued for duration of the emergency all attempts to secure complete
independence of the air force.’” This decision served merely to con-
centrate all efforts toward achieving a parity with the ground forces,
which seemed impossible of attainment under the present status and
constituency of GHQ. During the late summer and early fall, various
expedients were examined by members of the Air Staff and by con-
sultants drawn from the Bureau of the Budget.lo2 On 2 4 October
General Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff, forwarded to W P D a vigorous
objection to the existing organization, recommending the abolition of
GHQ and the establishment, under the Chief of Staff and a compact
General Staff, of autonomous air, ground, and service forces. This
proposal met with ‘‘100 per cent non-concurrences.” l o 3 A month
later, on 2 5 November, General Arnold recommended to the Chief
of Staff a reorganization of the War Department along similar lines
and the creation of a military policy staff for the President which
should include members from the several services and appropriate
civilian agencies.lo4The second part of this scheme lay entirely outside
the jurisdiction of General Marshall; but he was “favorably im-
pressed” by Arnold’s design for the War Department, and on 28
November he directed WPD to develop a detailed plan incorporating
its principal
Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, an air officer who had been drawn
into the General Staff under the recent liberalizing policy, was put in
charge of the project, H e was recalled from his current assignment
with the special observers in London, arriving in Washington just
after the Japanese attack in the Pacific and just in time to be named
to the Roberts Commission to investigate the disaster at Pearl
Harb0r.l“ Thus delayed, it was early February before McNarney’s
group had determined the general character of the reorganization. The
views of the AAF were presented to McNarney by a special com-
mittee appointed by Arnold and headed by Lt. Col. B. E. Gates.lo7
General Headquarters was not consulted until 5 February, but Gen-
eral McNair had long since been convinced of the impractical nature
2 6 2