T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
The new Combined Intelligence Committee also continued an exist-
ing organi~ation.~’The American members, who formed the U.S.
Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and representatives of the Depart-
ment of State, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Coordinator
of Information. A full-time committee was also appointed to work
permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash-
ington.
The Combined Military Transportation Committee (CMTC) was
to advise the CCS on transportation problems involved in their various
projects, especially in respect to requirements for overseas move-
memx80 For any contemplated operation, the American and British
members were to determine the shipping which could be made avail-
able by each nation through consultation respectively with the War
Shipping Administration and the Ministry of War Transport. Where
combined use of shipping was involved, any adjustments necessary
should be referred to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.
Where lack of shipping or kindred factors (rail, port, etc.) threatened
to strangle an approved plan, the CMTC with the CPS were to report
to the Combined Chiefs to obtain the requisite priorities. American
membership consisted of the War Department’s G-4 and his chief
transportation officer, a representative of the AAF, the director of
the Naval Transportation Service, and his planning officer.
In view of the acute problems of distribution of air materiel, the
combined Munitions Assignments Board (MAB) was of special
importance to the AAF.8’ This extended to British as well as Amer-
ican production the idea of inter-Allied control which had been func-
tioning since 1940, but which was now made even more necessary
by the adoption of the Victory Program. The mission of the MAB
was to keep current estimates of U.S.-British munitions resources,
considering such variable factors as production achievements, materiel
reserves, rates of wastage, combat forces, shifts in strategy, etc.; and,
on the basis of these estimates, to recommend to the CCS schedules
for the allocation of materiel among the United Nations. Separate
boards sat in Washington and London to assign respectively munitions
produced in the United States and United Kingdom. A civilian, Harry
L. Hopkins, headed the board in Washington, which included repre-
sentatives of the Army, Navy, and AAF, and of the three British
services. It was a token of the importance of this board to the AAF that
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