T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the American fleet, it was a t the same time necessary for the Japanese
to eliminate the danger of an effective reaction from the Hawaiian Air
Force. Accordingly, and simultaneously with the initial attack on the
fleet, twenty-eight bombers in three waves escorted by pursuits car-
ried out a ten-minute raid on buildings of the Hawaiian Air Depot
and the hangar line at Hickam Field. After a fifteen-minute lull, the
attack was renewed by five or six high-level bombers which fruit-
lessly bombed the baseball diamond; six to nine others dropped down
to 150 feet for a more damaging attack on the No. I Aqua System,
the technical buildings immediately behind the hangar lines, the con-
solidated barracks, and on planes parked almost wine tip to wing tip
on the warming-up apron. A third attack at approxlmately 0900 by
from six to nine planes scored hits on technical buildings, dispersed
planes, barracks, the parade ground, and the post exchange.’
At Wheeler Field, principal pursuit base, the first bombs fell shortly
after 0800. Approximately twenty-five dive bombers approzched the
field a t an altitude of about 5,000 feet, went into a dive, and released
their bombs over the hangar line. Within a few minutes the air seemed
full of planes circling in a counterclockwise direction but otherwise
maneuvering according to no apparent pattern. Though this attack
lasted for no more than fifteen minutes, other planes strafed the field
shortly after 0900. Bellows Field, third of the major Air Corps instal-
lations, suffered less than did either Hickam or Wheeler. Only one
plane out of the enemy’s first wave of attack, and that a fighter,
directed its attention to this field. But nine more fighters came over
soon after 0900 to give the field a thorough strafing for about fifteen
rnin~tes.~
In comparison with the havoc wrought by the planes that the Japa-
nese First Air Fleet threw against Hawaiian air and naval installations,
the reaction of defending air units was pitiful. The enemy had
achieved the crushing advantage of surprise. Moreover, under the
alert in effect since 27 November AAF planes were concentrated for
protection against sabotage, with an allowance of four hours’ notice
to make them ready for flight, instead of being dispersed in readiness
for a prompt take-off. In the circumstances, it was virtually impos-
sible to put up anything approaching an effective air defense. In spite
of handicaps, four P-40’s and two P-36’s took off from Wheeler Field
thirty-five minutes after the initial attack, and from 0830 until 0930
Army pursuit planes flew a total of twenty-five sorties. Perhaps the
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