D E P L O Y M E N T O N T H E E V E O F H O S T I L I T I E S
security of the route; for the islands in the South Pacific were virtually
defenseless, and the lack of troops for permanent garrisons meant that
slim forces had to be shifted from posts in the Hawaiian Islands. Gen-
eral Short was preparing garrisons of approximately 144 officers and
men for shipment to Canton and Christmas, but they were not sched-
uled to sail until mid-December. Pending their arrival, the defense of
the island bases would have to be provided by construction personnel,
whose hands already were more than full. In the effort to extend air
route facilities from Australia to the Philippines, General MacArthur's
representatives had surveyed a route that could be used for the ferry-
ing of pursuit aircraft.'" Given time, the prospects for speedy rein-
forcement of the Philippines by air were promising, but obviously
time was running out.
O n I December, General Arnold had written to the commander of
the Hawaiian Air Force: "We must get every B-17 available to the
Philippines as soon as possible." And on 6 December he arrived at
Hamilton Field for a personal inspection of preparations for the air
movement of the 38th and 88th Reconnaissance Squadrons to Hawaii
on the first leg of a flight to Mindanao. That evening, thirteen B-17'~
of the two squadrons took off from Hamilton and headed for Oahu,
where they were scheduled to arrive on the morning of 7 December."8
T h e eve of hostilities thus found no slackening in efforts to reinforce
the Philippines. AAF planes deployed outside the continental United
States had reached a total of 91 3 aircraft-636 pursuit planes and 61
heavy, 157 medium, and 59 light bombers-and they were divided
among Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland, Panama, Puerto Rico,
Trinidad, the Virgin Islands, British Guiana, the Windward and Lee-
ward islands, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines."' But the overseas
deployment which had begun with an emphasis toward Europe was
now focused on the western Pacific.
'93