T H E A I R C O R P S P R E P A R E S F O R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
program utilizing duplicate bombardment crews for the other types
should be initiated in 1943. For protection of the air bases, 10 pursuit
groups were to be located in the United Kingdom, 6 in the Near East.
To avoid overcongestion in those areas, the 4,000-mile-radius planes,
when available, would be based elsewhere, as in Newfoundland,
Greenland, Africa, or India.
T h e success of the whole program was predicated upon the ability
of American bombers to conduct daylight missions far into Europe.
In spite of earlier German and English experience, it was concluded
that “by employing large numbers of aircraft with high speed, good
defensive fire power, and high altitude,” it would be feasible to make
deep penetrations into Germany by day. But to guard against expected
improvements in German fighter defense, it was suggested that experi-
ments be begun immediately to develop a heavily armed and armored
escort fighter with long-range
T h e planners considered it improbable that a large-scale invasion of
Europe could be made before spring of 1944, which would coincide
with the climax of the bomber attack, and they believed that “if the
air offensive is successful, a land offensive may not be necessary.”
Complete victory through air power alone, however, could not be
assured, and provision was made for close support of ground forces in
that assault. T h e tactical air force should include 13 groups each of
light bombers (A-zo) and dive bombers, z photo reconnaissance
groups, I 08 observation squadrons, and 19 transport groups.’46Pursuit
units would include 5 groups set up as reserve for the British Isles and
such of the interceptor units there as might be spared.
Separate provisions were included for aircraft for training and for
the transport of air materie1.l4’ Estimates were made for the require-
ment in pilots (103,482) and in total personnel (2,164,916),~~*and
some general statements were given as to the methods of training.
T h e President in his directive had stated that he was “not suggesting
a detailed report,” but the air planners had, in effect, drawn up a
blueprint for the approaching war. From the vantage point of the
present it is easy to find flaws in this plan. Actual experience in the
war showed that the forces allocated for strategic defense in the Pa-
cific were inadequate, those for hemisphere defense too abundant. T h e
qualified faith in the ability of air power alone to conquer Germany
proved ungrounded, and the force scheduled for support of the inva-
sion was weak in fighters. But viewed solely as a program for the
‘49