T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
bombing offensives,” whereas “dependence cannot be placed on win-
ning important wars by naval and air forces alone”; and that in con-
sequence too little attention had been given to the build-up of large
ground forces which would be needed completely to defeat the Ger-
man war machine. In substance the Joint Board was not inclined to
believe that American entrance into the war, with initial co-operation
limited to air and naval action, would insure an early victory, and it
was convinced that over-all strategy should adhere more closely to that
described in ABC- I.
These comments were forwarded to the U.S. Army and Navy
special observers at London for presentation to the British chiefs of
staff.13’ The memorandum was discussed in a meeting of the special
observers and the British Joint Planning Staff on Z I N0~ember.l~’
The British felt that their review had been misunderstood, probably
because its brevity had made impossible a clear delineation of their
objectives. They gave a reasoned explanation of what they meant by
morale bombardment and of their choice of target objectives. Their
emphasis on the bomber offensive did not preclude a final land offen-
sive; but they had been studying the problems of landing operations
and had found many difficulties, and they expressed an interest in
American views on the detailed aspects of such an operation.
The early outbreak of the war postponed the American reply,
though the implied differences in outlook were to be debated on more
than one occasion later. There was in the British concept of strategy
perhaps no clear-cut break with the principles of ABC-I, rather a
difference of emphasis, with the British showing a tendency to subor-
dinate serious long-term planning for a large-scale invasion to more
immediate and less direct modes of attack. But if the British dictum
that it was “impossible to over-emphasize the importance of the
bomber offensive as a part of our offensive strategy” was perhaps a
stronger statement than the Joint Board could subscribe to, it was a
point of view which could be regarded somewhat more sympathet-
ically by the Air Staff. Actually, although both ABC-I and RAIN-
BOW No. 5 had scheduled the air attack from England as the earliest
American offensive action, neither plan had contained any detailed
statement of how that mission should be accomplished. Such a state-
ment was given in an AAF plan drawn up just on the eve of the
Atlantic conference, and in concept it did not differ greatly from the
British point of view.
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