T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
to continue. In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President
Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5 it became law with the defense-aid
act of 11 March, generally known as the Lend-Lease Under
this arrangement air materiel continued to be the most important item
of export, and it was essential to the success of the Air Corps program
that allocations under the new act be constantly reviewed in the light
of “changing political and strategic conditions.” In the machinery set
up for administering lend-lease, the Joint Aircraft Committee was
designated to serve as the Defense Aid Supply Committee for all avia-
tion materiel. The JAC thus acquired important administrative respon-
sibilities, but the broad policies governing the allotment of aid were
determined by the Pre~ident.~‘The fundamental policy for aircraft
was established within a few weeks, though the administrative details
continued to be subject to constant modification.
In the first lend-lease directive, the President extended its benefits to
Great Britain,g8thereby initiating the most powerful of the “measures
short of war” to aid that nation. It was not at all certain, however, that
such measures would be sufficient or that the United States could main-
tain its neutrality. On 27 March, Congress authorized the appropriation
of $7,000,000,000 for lend-lea~e.~~On the same day, committees repre-
senting the U.S. and British service staffs, which had been studying
jointly the best means of military collaboration if the United States
should join in the war, presented their first report (known as ABC-I)
on the grand strategy to be followed in a possible Anglo-American
war against the Axis.” T w o days later a second report, on air collabora-
tion, was submitted.100Known as ABC-2, this report recommended
that aircraft production be accelerated in both countries. As its first
objective, the United States should accomplish the AAF’s 54-group
program, with the view of employing a substantial portion of those
groups from England if America entered the war. The AAF should set
up as a further goal a program calling for roo groups, considered the
minimum requirement if the British Isles should be lost as a base for
our air forces. But it was also recommended that delivery of tactical
airplanes be made contingent upon the ability of the several services to
use them effectively and that therefore the AAF should defer the full
realization of its 54-group program to the extent that aircraft thus made
available could be used in the air offensive against Germany. Essen-
tially, this was an extension of the policy agreed on the previous July.
* See below, pp. 136-39.
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