T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
gains, both in planes manufactured and in the rate of acceleration,
came in the latter half of the year, when the fall of France and the
Battle of Britain lent a grim incentive to American efforts. By the end
of September 1940, contracts were outstanding for 16,649 Army air-
craft, of which 9,122 were ta~tica1.l~In the second half of that year,
3,770 military aircraft were accepted by all users; in 1941,the total
accepted was 19,428. Nor do these figures reveal the whole story;
there was, because of a trend toward heavy bomber types, a marked
increase in the average weight per plane as well as a numerical gain.20
Of the aircraft delivered the Air Corps received far too few to equip
its authorized fifty-four groups. Prospects for the future were, how-
ever, encouraging. The appropriations of 1939 and 1940were dwarfed
by those of the following year. In the first eight months of 1941,some
$6,500,000,000was appropriated, the major part of which was allo-
cated to the procurement of about I 5,000 aircraft and the enlargement
of productive capacity. All told, the Air Corps was authorized, in
the three years before Pearl Harbor, to expend about eight billion
dollars and to procure about 37,500 planes.’l It had not known such
generosity since I 9 I 7,
One policy of the Air Corps ran counter to the insistence on mass
production of existing models of aircraft. This was the continued stress
on research and development. Efforts to develop new types of air-
craft diverted talent from tasks of current utility to projects which,
if successful, might pay dividends in the future. The policy was costly,
but in view of the time lag between original design and quantity pro-
duction, it was essential if we were to keep abreast of German devel-
opments. The results of the research and development program were
not always spectacular. Many new airplane models were stillborn, or
died in the experimental stage. But the same program which spawned
such forgotten airplanes as the XP-44 or the XB-21 gave birth also
to the B-29, designed in 1940. Mass production was hampered even
more by the large number of modifications for current models which
this policy encouraged. Changes in design and equipment made
standardization difficult; “freezing” a model at a certain stage in its
development would have made for more rapid production. But to
keep abreast of foreign air forces, it was necessary to incorporate h-
provements which were constantly suggested by combat experience.
The earliest and most obvious lesson which came from the air war
in Europe was the need for heavier armor, greater defensive firepower,
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