A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
army air units, the airplane was chiefly a tactical weapon for support-
ing ground troops a t short range. While the navy’s concept was
broader, it did not encompass the necessity or desirability of long-
range, sustained air attacks on rear areas. There was nothing to indi-
cate that the Japanese comprehended the logistical possibilities of
transport aircraft, either for troop-carrier or for supply-dropping
purposes. T h e lack of co-operation between the army and navy forces
did not augur well for a war which might demand joint operations.
Furthermore, the division of the forces extended into the production
realm, where the army and navy competed for production facilities
and raw materials and failed to provide for the exchange of informa-
tion so vital to the efficiency of the Japanese aircraft industry.
Actually, the Japanese possessed neither the economic potential nor
the extensive technical skill necessary for developing and maintaining
a first-class air force. If other nations erred in underestimating the
strength of Japanese air power in 1941, the Japanese high command
for its part failed to appreciate the disparity between Japan’s air
potential and that of prospective opponents. In 1941,for example, the
aircraft industry in Japan turned out only 5,088 planes, while the
United States, though only in the initial stages of its conversion to a
wartime economy, produced 19,445. In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during 1941, the Japanese
training programs turned out about 3,000. T h e Japanese also seemed
to have had little appreciation of the problem of replacements, for
they sacrificed safety factors in aircraft to performance, and they
made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained
personnel. In the matter of airfield construction and maintenance of
aircraft, the Japanese had only rudimentary conceptions of the prob-
lems involved; no system had been developed for the rapid construc-
tion of airfields, while only small supplies of spare parts were kept on
hand and the number of depots for major repairs was inadequate for
extensive operations.8
T h e Japanese air forces were not prepared for a war of long dura-
tion. Their major dependence would be placed on the element of sur-
prise and on a few well-trained airmen in the execution of skillfully
laid plans. Confident of an early victory, they discounted the potential
strength of their enemies.
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