A I R W A R , 1 9 3 9 - 4 1
on a larger scale, and personnel were rotated frequently in order to
give combat experience to more a i ~ m e n . ~
In the Russo-Manchurian border fighting which broke oiit in May
1939, the Japanese Army Air Force received a much more severe and
devastating test of its strength. T h e Soviet Air Force, designed p i -
marily as an immediate support to the Red army, administered a
resounding defeat to the Japanese force, which committed almost its
entire strength to the engagement and lost approximately 500 planes
and 150 pilots. According to the Japanese, their losses were worth
while because they brought about important changes in organization,
training, and tactics. These changes, however, were accompanied by
no marked departure from existing concepts of air warfare, and the
chief development came in an accelerated rate of expansion.'
As the border fighting ended in September 1939, the poor record
of the Japanese Army Air Force led foreign observers to conclude
that the army's force was inferior in both training and efficiency to
the naval air force. There was some justification for such a belief.
Training in the army flying schools was devoted almost exclusively to
pilots, and training of other air crewmen was largely neglected until
their assignment to tactical units. T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all members of the crew, and by
1941 its training program was designed to turn out annually some
t ,500 navigators, bombardiers, gunners, and flight engineers. At the
same time, the navy was training about 2 , 0 0 0 pilots a year, while the
army was turning out pilots at the rate of approximately 7 5 0 a year.
In equipment, too, the army air force lagged behind the navy air force.
T h e latter possessed some excellent four-engine patrol bombers, while
the army had nothing heavier than a two-engine bomber. Prior to 7
December I 94 I the army air force flew almost exclusively over land,
and its longest-range bombers had an operational radius of only some
500 miles. T h e navy's force had been trained to operate over water
with a radius of about 800 miles. Both forces, however, had a number
of well-tried torpedo bombers, dive bombers, and level bombers,
reconnaissance and transport planes, and several models of the Zero
fighter-a fast, highly maneuverable but somewhat vulnerable plane
with a maximum speed of approximately 350 miles per hour." T h e
* The Japanese made no use of the manufacturer's name in the designation of their
aircraft, possibly because two or more manufacturers not uncommonly produced the
same type plane. Their type numbers instead corresponded to the last one or two
79