T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
plane in radius of action, speed and fire power” were as yet just begin-
ning to be visualized. “The world struggle for strategic air bases and
effective air fleets is well under way,” he concluded, “and will become
intensified with the fast-moving technical development of the airplane.
Air Power is as vital a requirement to the military efficiency of a great
nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory
in war for a nation in which it is lacking.”
These were the articles of faith on which the Army’s airmen stood
in the year of Munich, two years before the Battle of Britain. There
would appear to be little point in detailing further at this time the
continuing controversy with representatives of the W a r and Navy
departments. As noted at the close of the preceding section, the Joint
Board in June 1938-five months after General Andrews’ appeal to
the Secretary of War-officially denied the probability that the Air
Corps would in war require planes ‘(of greater practical ferrying
range, greater tactical radius, and greater carrying capacity than those
of the B- I 7.” Such a policy, if long adhered to, would have deprived
the AAF of the B-29. But world developments soon lent additional
weight to the arguments for the long-range bomber, and, when the
test came, the Army Air Forces not only had a well-defined doctrine
of air warfare for its guidance but the plane needed for the job.”
* For a discussion of the development of tactical principles, see below, pp. 597-99.
7’