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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

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So&Fet NOFORN Chapter 6 296 Two more A- l 2s were lost in later testing. On 9 July 1964, arti cle 133 crashed while landing when a pitch-control servo device froze, rolling the plane into a wing-down position. Ejecting from an altitude of 120 feet, the pilot was blown sideways out of the craft. Although he was not very high off the ground, his parachute did open and he landed during the parachute's first swing. Fortunately he was unhurt, and no news of the accident filtered out of the base. Eighteen months later, on 28 December 1965, article 126 crashed immediately after takeoff because of an improperly wired stability augmentation system. As in the previous crash, the pilot ejected safely. and there was no publicity connected with the crash. An investigation ordered by DCI McCone determined that the wiring error had resulted from negligence, not sabotage.'6 The A-12 made its first long-range, high-speed flight on 27 January 1965. The flight lasted I 00 minutes. 75 minutes of which were flown at speeds greater than Mach 3.1. and the aircraft covered 2.580 miles at altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet. By this time. the OXCART was performing well. The engine inlet, camera, hydrau lic, navigation, and flight-control systems all demonstrated acceptable reliability. Nevertheless, as the OXCART began flying longer, faster, and higher, new problems arose. The most serious of these problems in volved the aircraft's wiring. Continuing malfunctions of the inlet con trols, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instruments were often attributable to wiring failures. Wiring connec tors and components had to withstand temperatures above 800'F, structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Such demands were more than the materials could stand. Not all of the OXCART's problems could be traced to materiel failures, however, and Agency officials believed that careless maintenance by Lockheed employees also con tributed to malfunctions." Concerned that Lockheed would not be able to meet the OXCART's schedule for operational readiness, the Office of Special Activities' Director of Technology, John Parangosky, met with Kelly Johnson on 3 August 1965 to discuss the project's problems. Johnson not only assigned more top-level supervisors to the project but also '" Ibid.. pp. 80-81 {TS Codeword): Minnich. ··OXCART Story,"' pp. 17-18 tS). "OSA History. chap. 20. p. 9-4 (TS Codr:word). Seeret

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.