CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

259 Chapter 6 The U-2's Intended Successor: Project OXCART, 1956-1968 Before the U-2 became operational in June 1956, CIA project offi cials had estimated that its life expectancy for flying safely over the Soviet Union would be between 18 months and two years. After overflights began and the Soviets demonstrated the capability of tracking and attempting to intercept the U-2. this estimate seemed too optimistic. By August 1956, Richard Bissell was so concerned ·a6out the U-2's vulnerability that he despaired of its ability to avoid destruction for six months, let alone two years. To extend the U-2's useful operational life, project officials first attempted to reduce the aircraft's vulnerability to detection by Soviet radars. Project RAINBOW's efforts 10 mask the radar image of the U-2 not only proved ineffective, but actually made the aircraft more vulnerable by adding extra weight that reduced its maximum altitude. Because Soviet radar operators continued to find and track U-2s equipped with antiradar systems, the CIA canceled Project RAINBOW in May 1958. Long before the failure of Project RAINBOW, Richard Bissell and his Air Force assistant. Col. Jack A. Gibbs, had begun to look for a more radical solution to the problem of Soviet radar detection-an entirely new aircraft. {n the late summer of 1956, the two officials visited a number of airframe contractors in a search for new ideas. Among the more unusual was Northrop Aviation's proposal for a gi gantic aircraft with a very-high-lift wing. Because it would not be made of metal, the wing would require a type of bridge truss on its upper side to give it rigidity. The proposed aircraft would achieve See,et