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See, et NOFOAN
Chapter 4
mention of overflights by the United States. After the trip was over,
Khrushchev and other leading Soviet officials continued to make ex
aggerated claims about the extent of their missile force, adding to the
confusion and concern within the US intelligence community. Thus in
November 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev told a conference of
journalists, "Now we have such a stock of rockets, such an amount of
atomic and hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us, we could wipe
our potential enemies off the face of the earth." He then added that
"in one year, 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the as
sembly line in the factory we visited." 11 Because the Soviet Union
had been launching at least one missile per week since early fall, US
policymakers placed great weight on his remarks.
Despite the intelligence community's intense interest in the
Soviet Union's nuclear and missile programs, President Eisenhower
did not authorize any more overflights of the Soviet Union during the
remainder of the year. On the other hand, he raised no objections to
(and probably welcomed) the first British overflight of the Soviet
Union in December 1959. For almost a year, the RAF pilots of
Detachment B had been ready to fly over the Soviet Union, but Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan had not previously authorized any such
missions because of his own visit to the Soviet Union, several interna
tional meetings, and other state visits. As a result, British U-2 mis
sions had been confined to the Middle East. Now that the Prime
Minister's approval had been obtained, Detachment B conducted
Operation HIGH WIRE with an RAF pilot. Squadron leader Robert
Robinson left Peshawar on 6 December and overflew Kuybyshev,
Saratov Engels Airfield, and the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range
before landing at Adana. The mission photography was excellent, but
it did not provide intelligence on Soviet ICBMs, which were tested at
Tyuratam, not Kapustin Yar. 13
Because there had been so few overflights in 1958 and 1959,
many questions about the Soviet missile program remained unan
swered. Within the intelligence community there was still consider
able disagreement over the size of the Soviet missile force. Thus,
during testimony before the US Senate in January 1960, DCI Allen
Dulles, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, and Air Force Chief of
" William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York:
Random House, 1987), p. 10 I.
" OSA History, chap. 11, p. 33 (TS Codeword); Mission folder 8005 (6 December 1959),
OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 13 (TS Codeword).
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