The public concern \.i.th the phenor.er-", \lhich is retlectcd both
in the Unit.cd Sute:s press and in the pressure or 1r.4Ull7 upon the
Air Force, i ndi~tes tbt a f air ~oportion or our popul.1.tian
is a n~ll:, conditioced to the accepbnce or the ine---edible.
In this !'.!.ct lies tl-.e potential for the tauclung-ort or ms:s
bysteri:l a cd pinic.
b. Air Vul n~l""'.b~.lit-r - The United 31.ltes .\1r Uaruill: S7stem
v(-11. undcubtedl;r al\.,:i75 depend upon a cc::!,ir~tion or redar screen-
i.:6 and visU;ll obserntioo. The u.S.S.R. is credited ,dth the
p:-esent C-'.lp:1bilit7 .or celiveriDg en air atbc'!c agdnst.the
t"tlted States, yet nt sr17 given t1~nt now, tbere a7 be
cu::-:-eot a dozen of!ic!~l unidentified sightinis plus mny
\l!lo!!'ic:i:ll cnes. ~t Ul7 t1c:::i.ent of att.'.l.ck, \.'19 are nou 1n a
position ,:here ve ca::ot, on 3.D inst:int blsis, distinguish
b.r:.·'1:-e f!'o:i pb.nnt~, and e.s tension counts ,:e \lill ?'\Ul the
increasi?:g rislc of false alerts enc the even ~ter danger
of' f'nls9l:7 ic.enti!'r-~z the r eal as pb:lntc::.
7. Both or +.hese ~!'oble::.s e.re prire!'i].J ~rstic~l in mtu:re
but esch ccm~zi-s n.--,an7 ap;arent !!:4:P.l.lige:ce racta..-s....
8. Fl-o:i en 0?9:-a ti o::.d poi=.t of rlev, three actioos are
requi:-ec!:
e.. 1=.ei:L:?.te stet:s shculd be t:a.~,en to i.!lorove i c!enti!"ication
or both viscal e:".,j el~ct:-c:-.ic r,r.antco so t!ut~ 1n the event of
e:-i at~~='- , :!.r.st.:.r.t e.::1 ?:;si~·,e icie~tifictio:l of e-cecy pl:!.nes
o:- =i.s~~~~s ~:,. be ~~e .
b. A stu:i7 s:"!o-.tlc! be institute:i to deterr..ina \:t:it, if~,
ucli~ ::.o~ co-.:.ld ce :lee of t.h:?se ohenc=.et:2. b7 Ur.ited St.:1tes
psy~colcp.c.:1 l \.::lr fare p1a:1!:e:-s ar.:i \:!:at, if ail7 , defenses shculd
be pb.::..--:e;i in ar.tici~tio:1 or Soviet atte=?ts to utilizg thee.
c. l:i order to :,ini..,he risk of ~nic, a r.atier.:!l policy
sbe;°!.:.!d 0
::>':! es~b!.is~ed ~s to \:ba.t shculd be told the public
r eguc:.::5 ~ pb.er.c::.!m•
....,
9 • . Oti?e:- i:ltellieence probl~ \.thica reqcl.re deten::il::ltion
are: ...._
.
. a. ".i'r.e present h vel cf Soviet. knowledge =-c&-lrdir.e
, ..•.• tl:.ese ~'.::e:-:.c:::.!?::?.. . •. . • .
b. Possible !ioviet intentions and c::itebilities to
utili=e t~cse o~en~m to the cietnr:.cn-r. of Uniteci SUt.es
se~~:! _i~:e~~~t3~• . .. , .... ~-~. --.:..~.: . ·:~- ,-:.· ,• . -~--.:. .
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