Unidentified Flying Objects Reports

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

Aircraft lights or other sightings were seen. Crew of Knife 27 suspected objects escaped by descending below radar capability. B. On 020326L Dec, GCA and NTI radar reported Bogie 8NM southwest of NKP moving at same speed as Knife 28, night Recce chopper, at 120 knots. Knife 28 dispatched to area, but GCA lost Bogie when Knife 28 approached to within 2-3NM. GCA later lost Knife 28 at same spot when Knife descended below 1100 feet altitude. Knife 28 approached target without lights, then employed searchlight, but observed nothing. Moon reportedly had gone down and conditions were too dark to see well, as Knife 28 returned to base, GCA picked up Bogie again 1NM southeast of where it had disappeared, heading southeast. GCA lost it after 4-5NM, still heading southeast in vicinity of VD 5891. Part II. On 6 December, 606 SOS advisor to Thai Border Patrol Police (BPP), Region IV, reported that BPP had begun operation on 28 November between NKP and Sakhon Nakhon towns in same proximity as above sighting northwest of NKP. Four to six BPP and Royal Thai Army (RTA) helicopters were involved in this operation. In addition, BPP Region IV possesses one white heuy helicopter, which is used to monitor BPP operations. Historically, Thai pilots have been reluctant to fly at night, but the moon in recent days has made night flying almost as easy as daytime operations, and Thai pilots have been known to accomplish night flights in areas where terrain is well-known to them. As in the past, chopper operations by RTA and BPP are mostly local in nature and no flight plans are filed for resupply, placement of units, or monitoring activities unless proper pressure is brought to bear. Many BPP/RTA operations against communist terrorist are autonomous in nature, and thus centralized control is weak. As result, air defense surveillance system is often not informed of flights until later—if at all. BPP advisor is attempting to secure time so flights in support of above operation, including dates, and landing areas. Part III. Historically, November and early December have produced large numbers of radar returns, particularly on GCA scopes, from natural or cultural phenomena in THAILAND. These include temperature inversions, balloons from fairs and religious celebrations, migratory birds, and kites. In November 1967, HQ 7/13AF DI and DO ran experiment at Udorn when GCA scopes were reporting more than 15 low/slow returns in vicinity of Udorn RTAFB. Group observers physically sighted scores of balloons, three flocks of migratory birds, several kites, plus at least four local choppers in a span of ten minutes. At same time these sightings, even of legitimate friendly flights, failed to correlate with Brigham (Udorn RTAFB-based GCI radar) and GCA returns. On numberous occassions it was established that phenomena, which U.S. personnel in GCI site would not report as authentic traffic, was reported into AOC and air defense system by Thai operators. U.S. personnel attributed these to propagation anomalies. Further investigation attributed a number of sporadic returns to over-the-horizon signals distorted by weather conditions.

To date, there is no confirmed evidence that hostile aircraft or helicopters have penetrated Thai air space in support of insurgent or communist activities. Though it is possible that illicit friendly flights for purposes of private gain, pleasure, smuggling are being conducted, there is no evidence to substantiate this possibility at present time. It is suspected that Lao and Thai Air Force officers can and do employ RLAF and RTAF aircraft in private ventures or travel without filing proper flight plans for informing components of the air defense surveillance system. Part IV. Nature of recent reported sightings follows same pattern as "unknown returns" reported last year by Ubon and Udorn. In analysis of possible hostile penetration of THAILAND and in support of insurgent forces, preliminary study was conducted of technical aspects of such flights. It was found that to land in remote jungle clearings at night to airlift personnel or provide resupply was highly dangerous and improbable, especially in absence of sophisticated navigation and landing aids, and was beyond technical capability of U.S. air crews. Further, study of Air Order of Battle of nearby communist or neutral countries indicates that available helicopter strength is such that hostile or unfriendly forces do not possess adequate numbers of low/slow aircraft to undertake such missions with accompanying risk factor, when they are unable to support their own field