TOP SECRET
- 17 -
2. Capabilities for Implementing Reprisal Actions
a. Forces available initially for effecting reprisals would consist of US forces already deployed in the general areas mentioned, such further US forces as might be deployed to these areas in case of Soviet or GDR counteraction, and such forces and facilities as Britain and France (and possibly West Germany) might make available.
b. Random reprisal actions could be accomplished with currently deployed forces. As the scope and severity of reprisal actions increase, additional units from the CONUS would have to be deployed, thereby in all probability creating an imbalance in overall deployments of naval and air units. The magnitude of the imbalance would be dependent on the extent of participation of British and French units. For full control of the high seas and international airspace, mobilization measures involving activation of naval and air reserves would be required.
c. US effort applied in reprisals against Soviet and GDR merchant shipping and air activities could become disproportionate to the real effects obtainable. A considerable portion of US sea and air forces could become involved, thus adversely affecting overall US defense posture unless additional forces were mobilized.
d. It is necessary that clear, specific and thorough guidance be provided to military officers at all echelons who may be expected to execute acts of harassment or reprisal. When the acts to be consummated are established, specific instructions must be promulgated by appropriate authority. All officers must act under explicit orders and be authorized to use force, to the specified degree, where necessary to carry out instructions.
e. In carrying out reprisals at sea and in the air involving the forceful stopping of Soviet or GDR shipping or aircraft it must be recognized that the United States would probably be placed in the position of firing the first shot and perhaps of sinking one or more vessels.
f. Planning for such operations would be the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the direction of the Secretary of Defense.
3. Actions comparable to those listed above could also be applied to other Bloc nations, if and when they overtly supported Soviet-GDR action with respect to Berlin.
TOP SECRET