Documents / FOIA release
This Top Secret study by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, dated July 12, 1961, and released by the Central Intelligence Agency, answers NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961. It sets out courses of action for the Berlin crisis but does not judge their merits. It covers imminent presidential decisions, a three-phase timetable running to January 1, military preparations and mobilization, covert action, economic sanctions, public information, negotiating positions and checkpoint procedures for East German personnel.
“US Air Force”14 pages
## TOP SECRET (7) Conduct air operations through the corridors to Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet, with fighter escorts if necessary, and increase reconnaissance flights. (8) Extend enlistments and terms of obligatory service of personnel now in active service. (Enabling legislation would be required.) b. Measures requiring longer lead time. (1) Bring US forces in Europe to full wartime strength (requiring in excess of 14,000 personnel). This would necessitate a substantial increase in selective service quotas in order to replace personnel withdrawn from units in the United States. In addition, the US should persuade our Allies to bring their forces in Europe to full wartime strength, and to provide the necessary combat support units. (2) Step up the pace of procurement and materiel modernization. This would involve a necessary degree of industrial mobilization and establishment of priorities. (3) Move selected units of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and USAF to Europe, identifying this move, if appropriate, as an air mobility training exercise. (4) Take steps to insure an improved ability to rapidly deploy troops to Europe by means of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). (5) Increase US war reserve stockpiles of arms, ammunition, equipment, food, POL, and other supplies in Europe. (6) Move additional nuclear weapons forward in closer proximity to Army and Air Force forces which may require them. (7) Increase the state of readiness of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). (8) Make logistic preparations for call-up of several reserve component divisions. This would include steps to reactivate appropriate camps and training areas as well as steps to provide for the stocks of arms, equipment, and other material required. (9) Increase
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 163 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.