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b. Transfer of the UN Headquarters to Berlin, without necessarily changing the formal status of the city;
c. Establishment in Berlin of a European Headquarters for the UN, with conference facilities, a permanent staff, et cetera;
d. Transfer to Berlin of the headquarters of one or more UN specialized agencies;
e. Establishment in Berlin of a UN representative, as a UN "presence" in the city to investigate points of friction, et cetera;
f. A UN trusteeship, or some similar status, for Berlin.
D. Soviets in State of Doubt About Our Deterrent
21. A third and perhaps more likely possibility than either of the two extremes of maximum effectiveness (of our deterrent) or complete failure of our deterrent would be the development of a situation where the Soviets are left in a state of doubt about the credibility of our deterrent. Under these circumstances, they might be hesitant to move decisively without the possibility of calling a halt, but they might also be unwilling to retreat openly or to accept any arrangement which could not be represented as a considerable achievement of their objectives. Such a state of mind on their part could, of course, involve a greater or lesser degree of doubt and this would affect the specifics of what they might accept. Under such circumstances, the possibility might exist of working out an arrangement which would be tolerable for both sides while avoiding the kind of direct confrontation of force which would strain the Western Alliance to the breaking point or constrain the Soviets to test the seriousness of our intentions by counteracting forcefully our attempt to reopen access. Such an arrangement would tacitly concede that the Soviets can, whenever they wish, turn over their controls to the GDR, while conceding also that the Western Powers intend to hang on to the essentials of their position in Berlin. The most refined approach of this kind is the old Solution C of the April 1959 London Working Group Report. (A summary of this proposal is attached.) In essence it involves a series of interlocking but unilateral declarations on Berlin access aimed at achieving a freezing of existing procedures, with ultimate Soviet responsibility being maintained, although implementation might be by the East German authorities. Although it is possible to vary the complexity and specific content of this approach
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