TOP SECRET
- 3 -
5. The earlier a partial mobilization begins, the wider will be the range of non-nuclear choice when the crisis occurs. More forces will be available, and the forces will be better ready for their tasks. The earlier the US acts to improve its military posture, the greater the power it can bring to bear. The first purpose of military build-up is to forestall a Berlin crisis by showing our determination to defend Allied rights. The earlier a partial mobilization is begun, the more such deterrent effect is gained.
6. The military measures which can be taken prior to declaration of a limited national emergency and the beginning of partial mobilization are relatively few. Their effects on Soviet decisions and on US readiness are not apt to be of much real significance.
7. The military portion of the over-all US timetable contained herein shows one possible program of action. Many others are possible, and several have been analyzed in equal detail. The principal variables are the time that partial mobilization begins, and its scale. The actions listed in the timetable represent major military actions. These, together with other actions, are discussed in following sections. Additional detail concerning these actions has been developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is available.
8. As Mr. Acheson's preliminary report on Berlin points out, much more military planning would be needed to prepare forces to execute the proposals. Two prior requirements exist, however. There must be some basis for expectations about the size and timing of additional forces, and there must be a further formulation of the purposes and objectives to be militarily pursued. Within existing force levels and existing strategic policy guidance, not much more planning can usefully be done, nor is there much capability to execute the sort of expanding non-nuclear action contemplated in Mr. Acheson's report.
TOP SECRET