Top
lanes for reconnaissance and attacks against shipping and naval targets
of opportunity. Some of these submarines might alternatively have
missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling off major
NATO naval bases to report on NATO movements and attack major
warships. DIA and Navy believe that, in a typical initial wartime
deployment, some 20 submarines would be positioned astride NATO's
sea lines of communication to attack warships and ships carrying critical
materiel to Europe in the initial phase of a war. The number of Soviet
submarines dedicated to this effort would be scenario dependent. (IV,
168-169)
r. Potential Effectiveness of Soviet Naval Operations in the
North Atlantic. Paragraphs 191-197 of chapter IV consider that the
evident technical limitations of the weapons and sensors on Soviet ships,
submarines, and aircraft could impact significantly on Soviet efforts to
control the Norwegian and Barents Seas, although the mutually
supportive aspects of some operations may offset certain technical
weaknesses. DIA and Navy believe that these paragraphs should convey
a more balanced appraisal of potential effectiveness and that, as now
phrased, they tend to overstress the weaknesses of Soviet platforms; they
tend to give inadequate consideration of strengths, including the
operation of these platforms as a mutually supportive force; and they
tend to assess effectiveness in tactical contexts which are unrealistic.
(IV, 191-200)
s. Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges that, under certain circumstances,
nuclear operations at sea would not await employment of nuclear
weapons on land. All other agencies estimate that the USSR would be
unlikely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons at sea while a war was
being fought with only conventional weapons against NATO in Europe.
(V, 10-1.)
t. Speed of New Soviet Nuclear-Powered Attack (SSN) and
Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile (SSGN) Submarines. DIA and Navy
estimate that the maximum speeds for some of the new SSN and SSGN
classes could reach 37 knots. CIA estimates that these submarines will be
capable of speeds up to 33 knots. (VI, 63)
u. Effectiveness of the Soviet Aircraft Carrier Kiev and Its
Impact Upon the Evolution of Soviet Naval Missions. CIA and State
believe that a few ships of this class do not represent a significant
improvement in Soviet capabilities to fight a war with NATO. They,
and NSA, believe that, although it may constitute a major turning point
in the development of the Soviet Navy, it is premature to judge the
impact of the accqutisition of carriers upon the evolution of naval
missions. DIA and Navy hold that the introduction of the Kiev
21