Table VI-1
Projected Soviet Peripheral Strike Forces Opposite NATO a
1979, 1983, and 1988
1979 1983 1988
MRBMs and BIBMs
SS-4 Launchers 384 140 0
Silo ....... . ....... 64 56 0
Aboveground 320 84 0
SS-5 Launchers 61 51 0
Silo ...... ..... 27 27 0
Aboveground 34 24 0
SS-20 ........ .... 45-63 171 27
SS-20 Mod 13 . 0 9 171
Bombers of Long Range Aviation
TU-16 Badgers ..... 325 300 250
TU-22 Blinders 155 140 100
Backfires . ... 45 115 160
Ballistic Missile Submarines/Launchers b
SS-N-4 (G-1) 1.......... 1/3 0 0
SS-N -5 (G-Il) ... ........................ 6/18 3/9 0
SS-N -5 (H -I1) ... .... ................... 4/12 0 0
aFor a more detailed treatment of the peripheral strike forces, the implications and possible constraints
of a SALT agreement, and alternative projections of future peripheral strike forces, see NIE 11-6-78, Soviet
Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack.
b Some of the modern Y-class submarines probably have contingency missions for peripheral strike. As
the number of older ballistic missile submarines with peripheral missions declines, some of their target
coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic missile submarines.
limitation on the rate of Backfire production. If this target coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic.
enters into effect, LRA could have almost 200 Back- missile submarines. The range of the missiles carried
fires in 1988, of which about 160 would be deployed by these modern SSBNs gives them greater targeting
opposite NA'TO. In the near term, we expect Backfires flexibility than the G- or H-classes.
to be deployed primarily with LRA units in the
European USSR, enabling some Badgers, especially Support Systems and Forces
those capable of delivering both bombs and air-to- 101. Command, Control, and Communications.
surface missiles, to be transferred to the Soviet Far We estimate that, currently, about one week would be
East. required before the Pact's wartime communications
99. The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters
rincs for peripheral strike probably will decline during and to supporting strategic commands. Communica-
the period of our projections. The Soviets probably tions, between Moscow and the fronts and within the
will continue to convert their G-I submarines to attack fronts, to control combat operations by divisions and
or special-purpose submarines or retire them. We armies could be effectively established within a few
estimate that some of the G-II submarines, which are days. However, the Pact has two programs under
targeted against the peripheral areas, will be in the way-the creation of a centralized command structure
force until the mid-1980s, but the last G-II probably and the establishment of a unified communications
will b~e deactivated before 1988. The future of the system-which, during the period of this Estimate,
H-Il submarine as a ballistic missile system is in doubt could shorten the time required by the Pact to get its
because of the limitations of a prospective SALT command and control system prepared for war. The
agreement. two programs are intended to establish in peacetime
the theater-level (High Command) resources needed
100. As the number of older ballistic missile subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from
rines with peripheral missions declines, some of their national control. We estimate that the centralized
VI-13
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