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Chapter 1
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over DCI Dulles, but a project of this magnitude also required the
support of the Air Force. Some Air Force officials, however, feared
that a decision to build the CL-282 might jeopardize the Air Force's
own RB-57 and X-16 projects. Just one month earlier, in October
1954, the Wright Air Development Command had appealed to the Air
Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, U. Gen. Donald L.
Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar-
gued that the Bell X-16 was a better design because it was more air-
worthy than the CL-282 and could be used throughout the Air Force
in different types of missions because it had two engines, wheels, and
an armor-plated, pressurized pilot's compartment. If J57 engines were
diverted to the CL-282, the appeal to General Putt warned, there
would not be enough of these popular powerplants to meet the needs
of the X-16 program.62
Having heard of the Wright Air Development Command attack
on the CL-282, Allen Donovan of the Intelligence Systems Panel met
with General Putt on 19 October to argue in favor of the Lockheed
design. This discussion led General Putt to meet with 15 scientists
from the Technological Capabilities Panel on 18 November 1954 to
discuss the merits of the four proposed reconnaissance aircraft. Also
present as a briefer was Maj. John Seaberg from the Wright Air
Development Command, who later recalled:
What 1 did was present the results of my comparative analysis of
all four designs. 1 showed the relative high altitude petfortnance
capabilities of all four 1 pointed out that aerodynamically the
Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were close. Martin's B-57,
being a modification, was not quite as capable. I stated that, in
my opinion, the J73 [General Electric engine] would not be
good enough to do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, 1
overlaid a curve showing that with the J57 [Pratt & Whitney en-
gine] installed, it would then be competitive with the Bell and
Fairchild designs."
This meeting—along with the knowledge that President
Eisenhower also supported the CL-282—helped win over the Air
Force. To be on the safe side, however, the Air Force did not abandon
the X- 16 program until the Lockheed aircraft had begun flying.
Donovan interview (S).
" Quoted in Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 13.
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