et NOFORN
Chapter
168
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
(012958 1.6(dli1l>1010<25Yrs
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In authorizing another overflight of the Soviet Union, President
Eisenhower directed that it be conducted before 30 March. Because of
in getting permission from Pakistan to use the airfield
however, the mission could not be staged in March, and
agreed to extend his deadline until 10 April 1960. One
day before the ex• • deadline, a U-2 equipped with a
B-camera took off en the last successful overflight of
the Soviet Union, Iperation SI RE DEAL. As had been the case
during the previous two overflights, a second U-2 flew a diversionary
mission along the Soviet-Iranian border.\ mis-
sion 4155 headed first for Saryshagan, where it obtained the first pic-
tures of two new Soviet radars, the HEN HOUSE and HEN ROOST
installations. The U-2 then flew to the nuclear testing site at
Semipalatinsk. Returning to the Saryshagan area, it crisscrossed the
railroad network there and then proceeded to Tyuratam, where it pho-
tographed a new two-pad, road-served launch area that suggested a
new Soviet missile was in the offing."
In his memoirs Nikita Khrushchev remarked that this U-2 should
have been shot down, "but our antiaircraft batteries were caught nap-
ping and didn't open fire soon enough." Khrushchev explained that
Soviet missile designers had developed a high-altitude antiaircraft
missile and batteries of this missile had been deployed near known
targets of the U-2.'9
The CIA already had strong indications of improvements in the
Soviet air defense system, and early in 1960 the Development
Projects Division had asked Air Force experts at the Air Technical
Intelligence Center (ATIC) for a frank assessment of Soviet capabili-
ties against the U-2. On 14 March 1960, Col. William Burke, acting
chief of the DPD, relayed the ATIC assessment to Richard Bissell:
The greatest threat to the U-2 is the Soviet SAM. Although the
ATIC analysis concedes a remote possibility that the SAM may
be less effective than estimated, their present evaluation is that
the SAM (Guideline) has a high probability of successful inter-
cept at 70,000 feet providing that detection is made in sufficient
time to alert the site."
'" Mission folder 4155.9 April 1960, OSA records.] 1(TS Codeword).
" Nikita S. Ithrushche y, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little,
Brown. & Co., 1974), pp. 443-444.
x Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell, Deputy Director (Plans). from Col. William Burke,
Acting Chief, DPD, "Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations," 14 March 1960, IC
Staff, COMIREX records CHALICE (General)" (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED