Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
A society whose fertility begins to fall rapidly is
undergoing a profound transformation. Most basically,
it has begun to trust the permanence of lowered infant
and childhood mortality, something that is hard to per-
ceive at the family level, and something that may
require denial of finnly embedded beliefs. The society
has otherwise begun to change its traditional way of
life by moving away from rural, agrarian values and to
embrace the smaller family nonns associated with
urbanization and economic development.
Rostow’s term “takeoff,” which used to describe a
stage in economic development, has been largely dis-
credited by other economists (although it is not clear
whether this is because Rostow was overall simplistic
or because he went to work for US President
Johnson). “Takeoff,” however, seems appropriate to
describe certain changes in fertility and growth that
change the “momentum of growth” from positive to
negative. Brazil and Mexico are both at that point
now, and, while any number of observers of different
stripe continue to focus attention on the problems of
severe poverty that haunt sectors or regions of both
countries, the demographic picture is reasonably opti-
mistic. Rely on the pessimistic reports if you will, but
the economic transformation of both societies is inher-
ent in their current demographic profiles.
Infant mortality data offer a measure of societal well-
being that is highly sensitive to change. Public health
authorities argue that the infant mortality rate is the
best measure ofthe health of'a society, and, even if
this is hyperbole, surely there is a high correlation
between such mortality and the prosperity of a society.
Overall mortality is also a valuable indicator. Mortal-
ity remained constant in Eastern Europe from the mid-
19605 until the late l980s--and actually increased in
the USSR during the same period—while mortality
was falling in virtually all other countries. There is,
indeed, good reason to suspect that these mortality
trends have real meaning, just as Moynihan pointed
out.
Within the context of this discussion, demographic
data should be considered as analogous to an air photo
in which “signatures” of various kinds indicate a dan-
gerous ground truth. My initial investigations into this
area have led me to some hypotheses about demo-
graphic processes that correlate strongly with societal
troubles. It is important at the onset to understand that
such correlation is modest at best with general popula- <
tion growth. That, of course, is why so many extreme
neo—Malthusians insist very loudly that you believe
them; the ideology is strong, but the evidence is weak.
I will limit my remarks here to a single case of ethnic
strife, that of Sri Lanka’s two postwar insurgencies.‘
The Youth Bulge in Sri Lanka
As Professor Stoddard implied, if you look at the his-
torical or cultural context ofthe ongoing conflict in Sri
Lanka, a complex situation emerges. Indeed, political
scientists and analysts in the State Department and
elsewhere have accounted for this in many ways.
Many cite ancient animosities between Tamils and
Sinhalese.
The demographic data suggest another reason behind
the conflict, however. Figure l4 shows the age struc-
ture of the two ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Using Dal-
las Femando’s method of looking at the Sri Lankan
population by revenue district, we are able to break
down ethnic group data to determine age structure of
the populations. This graph reflects two distinct demo-
graphic transitions—a leading transition for the Sinha-
lese, who predominantly live in the country’s wet
zone, and a lagging one for the Tamils, who live in the
dry zone. It reveals a correlation between the incidents
of conflict between the two ethnic groups and the pro-
portion of each population that is youthful (ages 15 to
24)—those who are in demand of land, jobs, higher
education, opportunity, and other kinds of resources in
the society.
When the British left Sri Lanka, they left these
resources largely under Tamil control. After all, the
Sinhalese had resisted British penetration, while the
Tamils had worked in the civil service not only in Sri
Lanka but -elsewhere in the empire as well.
‘
See Population Geography, June 1984, pp. l-ll.
152
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268