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to estimates were indeed the quality output of the Office and consumed a large portion of the Office effort. Current intelligence was a poor third, in both quality and quantity of effort. As OSI developed a basis from which to move forward and to devote more time to both current and long-range problems, the balance of effort slowly shifted. Thus while NIEs still today remain the ultimate in intelligence reporting, OSI's efforts in the production of current intelligence have gradually increased and a second periodical for current reporting was established. A decline in the quantity of depth research production was evident for a time, particularly in the mid-1960s, but recent efforts have again pushed the rate of production upward. In addition, this type of reporting has become increasingly responsive to the intelligence problems of today as programming of projects takes effect.
A. Planning and Programming
Although OSI's programming has been somewhat unjustly criticized as "being born without benefit of clergy," the criticism that is has never had a generally accepted set of guidelines controlling its make up does have some truth. It has been subject to the influence of many different people and conditions.
As might be expected in the early 1950s, the newly established Office was attempting to fill the critical
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